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1
 • Introduction 
Housing markets in many European cities are characterized by strong 
government intervention in the form of priee controls, subsidies, 
zoning etc. This is one of the reasons why frequently disequilibria 
are observed on the urban housing raarket as a whole and its various 
submarkets; these disequilibria manifest themselves in queues of 
households waiting and searching for better dwellings on the one hand, 
and vaoancies on the other. In order to be able to describe these 
phenomena models of housing markets need to be developed that take 
these disequilibria into account explicitly. In the present paper some 
steps in that direction will be taken. 
Housing market research during the last decade his been focussed in 
residential location models using discrete choice theory and random 
utility models as a point of departure (see e.g. Clark and Van Lierop, 
1986). This has given rise to a strong micro bias and also a demand 
side orientation to housing market research. In the present paper an 
effort is made to study urban housing markets from a meso perspective. 
An integral picture of a dynamic market where households enter, change 
in size and finally disappear will be given. Housing supply is hetero-
geneous and families of different size and social class will have 
different preferences. The model accordingly describes the housing 
market 'career' of a household during its life-cycle. 
In the model vacancy chains are taken into account since each moving 
household leaves a vacant dweiling that may be occupied by another 
household in the next period. The usual way of dealing with vacancy 
chains is by means of Markov models (see Porell, 1982). Our model is 
not a usual Markov model however, since it follows from the specifica-
tion that the transition probabilities are not constant. These proba-
bilities depend on the stock variables in the housing market, so that 
a non-linear dynamic system is obtained. Consequently, existence, 
uniqueness and stability of an equilibrium solution are no longer self 
evident (see Haag and Weidlich, 1984). 
The present model bears some resemblance to a dynamic stock-flow 
model developed by Weibull (1980). Like Weibull we deal with the 
housing market as a system of interrelated submarkets that usually 
will be in a state of permanent disequilibrium (i.e. no Walrasian 
equilibrium will appear in a stationary state). The present model 
however gives a more detailed picture of the dynamics of the house-
holds. Anas and Cho (1986) also deal with a (partially) regulated 
housing market but do not deal explicitly with household dynamics. In 
the present model prices do not play an explicit role. The market is 
assumed to be fully regulated: dwellings are rented and rents are 
assumed to be fixed. 
Section 2 of the paper is devoted to the presentation of a simple 
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version of the model in which N types of dwellings are distinguished 
and houselholds are assumed to be homogeneous. Existence, uniqueness 
and stability of the equilibrium solution will be discussed. In sec-
tion 3 this model will be extended by relaxing the assumption of 
homogeneous households. Different sizes of households will be distin-
guished and life-cycle phenomena are taken into account. In this 
extended model households may move, either because they found a dwei-
ling which is more attractive than the present one (their class being 
unchanged) or because they recently entered another class so that 
their preferences and possibilities have changed. Section 4 is devoted 
to an illustration by means of numerical simulation experiments. 
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. 
2. Basic Model 
This section is devoted to the presentation of a simplified model in 
which there is only one type of household, while there exist N types 
of dwellings. All households have the same preference-ordering with 
respect to these types of dwellings. If they are not able to occupy a 
dweiling of the most preferred type, they will for some time accept a 
less preferred one and move from there to higher preferred types. As 
long as they do not occupy a dwelling of the most preferred type they 
continue to search. 
Total population is assumed constant, but in each period some house-
holds disappear, while new ones are formed. Starting households ini-
tially do not occupy a dwelling; vacancies occur because of disappear-
ing households. In the models that will be discussed in this paper 
starting households include both newly formed households and immigrat-
ing ones. Similarly, disappearing households include terminating as 
well as outmigrating households. 
2.1. Some definitions and identities 
There are N types of dwellings. Type 1 is most preferred, type N is 
least preferred. The number of dwellings of each type is denoted as 
Wn (N»1,...,N). The total number of dwellings is W: 
N 
W = Z, W W > 0 for n=1,...,N (2.1) 
n=1 n n ' 
The number of households occupying a dwelling of type n is denoted as 
Bn (n= 1,...,N). The number of households that do not yet occupy^ 
dwelling is Bfj+i. The total number of households is B: 
N+1 
B = l B 0 £ B < W for n=1 N (2.2) 
n=1 n n _n 
The number of vacant dwellings of type n is Ln: 
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Ln = Wn - Br n=1 N (2.3) 
It follows that: 
L = B^ +1 + W B (2.4) 
From this equation it may be inferred that the total number of vacant 
dwellings eonsists of two parts: one caused by overall excess supply 
(equal to W-B if W>B and equal to zero otherwise) and one caused by 
friction (equal to BN+-| if W>B and to B^ +i + W-B otherwise). 
All households that do not occupy a dweiling of the most preferred 
type are searching, so that the total number of searching households 
equals: 
S - B - B (2.5) 
These households have, in one way or another, to be confronted with 
the vacant dwellings. 
2.2. The distribution mechanism -
A simple distribution mechanism is the following one: draw randomly 
and without replacement a vacant dweiling from the total stock of 
vacant dwellings and a searching household from the total stock of 
searching households and confront them with each other; continue this 
procedure until there are no vacant dwellings or no searching house-
holds left over. 
A household that received an offer may accept or refuse. In the 
former case allocation takes place and the household occupies the 
vacant dweiling. A new vacancy will emerge if tóhis household did 
already occupy a dweiling;'if it did not yet occupy a dweiling this 
will not be the case. If the offer is not accepted the household goes 
on searching. If the offer is accepted search will orily be stopped if 
the offer concerned a dweiling of type 1, otherwise it will be con-
tinued Immediately. 
It is assumed that every searching household acceptsi every offer 
that concerns a dweiling of a type preferred to the one presently 
occupied. One may interpret this as an assumption of zero moving 
costs. Households that did not yet occupy a dweiling are assumed to 
accept all offers. 
The probability q that a searching household receives^a~noffer may 
on the basis of the foregoing be determined as: 
q = L/S 
q = 1 
if L < S 
if L > S 
(2.6) 
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Given that an offer is received, the probability that it will be 
accepted depends on the type of dweiling presently occupied by the 
household that receives the offer and on the type of dweiling that the 
offer is concerned with. The fraction of vacant dwellings that are of 
type n is Trn: 
= Ln/L n- 1, ,N (2.7) 
The probability that a household, presently occupying a dweil ing of 
n-1 
type n accepts an offer is . Z ir. while that probability for a house-
l
 N 
hold not occupying a dweiling at present is equal to 1 (= .1 ir . ) . 
The probability that a vacant dweiling will be offered to a search-
ing household is: 
r - S/L 
r = 1 
if S < L 
if S > L 
(2.8) 
The probability that a vacant dweiling, given that it is offered to 
a searching household, will be accepted depends on its type and the 
type of dweiling presently occupied by the household to which it is 
offered. The fraction of searchers presently occupying a dweiling of 
type n (n = 2 N) or no dweiling at all is pn. 
Pn = Bn/S n= 2,...,N+1 (2.9) 
The probability that an offered dweiling of type n will be accepted is 
N+1 
thus equal to E p.. Offers of dwellings of type 1 are always accept-
N+1 j=n+1 
ed since.E„ p .= 1. 
J=2 Hj 
2.3- Streams of removers 
The total number of households moving from a dweiling of type n into 
one of type m, snm is equal to: 
t ,, , t t „t-1 
Sr,m = (1-V) q TT B„ 
nm m n 
m= 1,...,n-1; n= 1 N+1 (2.10) 
The stream of removers from type n to type m dwellings is thus equal 
to the total number of households presently occupying a dweiling of 
type n times the probability q that an offer will be received times 
the probability that a received after concerns a dweiling of type m , 
taking into account the probability of household termination v. 
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If q is smaller than 1 it follows from (2.6) and (2.5) that:D 
t 
nm 
(1-v) (W - B^"1) B^_1/(B 
m m n Bf 1) -» (< (2.11 ) 
Taking into account the disappearance of households (at a rate v, 
0<v<1) the following difference equations will hold: 
B^ - (1-v) B^ 1 
Bfc = (1-v) Bt_1 
n n 
B. N+1 (1-v) B 
t-1 
N+1 
N+1 
+ £„ s , 
m=2 m1 
-
 nË 1 m'Si 
N 
m ' = 
nm' 
t 
1 N+1m 
N+1 
+ Z 
m=n+1 
+ vB 
mn 
n-2, ,N - (2.12) 
The . last one of these equations expresses the assumption that 
starting households initially do not occupy a dweiling. 
N 
Substitution of (2.10) into (2.11) and writing B - E„ B for 
„ , m=1 m 
N+1 
,Z B yields: 
m'=n+1 m 
B^ = (1-v) { B*~1 + qÜ ^ (B - B^"1)} 
all 
nt ,. . , ,. t n-1 t , „t-1 , t B„ = (1-v) {(1- q .1. ir ,) B^ + q 
n m'=1 m' n 
B?,..= (1-v) {(1 - qfc) B ^ } + vB 
TT (B - ZA n m=1 c1» 
m 
n=2,. 
(2.13) 
,N 
'N+1 x ' l ' H ' N+1 
It should be noted that in the present model the values of qfc and 
the ir s are not fixed exogenously, but will be endogenously determined 
(of. equations 2.6 and 2.7). Consequently, this model is not an ordi-
nary Markov model with fixed parameters. The transition probabilities 
depend on the state of the system itself. Nevertheless the resemblance 
of the system of equations (14) to a Markov model is of some use as 
will become clear in the next section. The dependence of the transi-
tion probabilities on the state of the system means essentially that 
supply constraints for housing are taken into account. Overcrowding in 
certain dweiling types is avoided in this model. 
The purpose of the model is to explain the distribution of the 
population over the different types of dwellings, given the numbers of 
dwellings of each type, the preferences of the households, the distri-
bution mechanism and the stopping/starting rate. 
1) In this subsection an upper index t is used for the endogenous 
variables to denote their time dependence. Later on this index will 
sometimes be suppressed in order to avoid unnecessary complexity of 
notation. 
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2.M Stationary states 
The system of equations (2.13) may be used to explore the dynami.es  
lof the present model. This system is in a dynamic equilibrium if the 
;values of the Bn's remain the same as time moves on. Such an equili-
brium is called a stationary state and one may wonder whether such a 
state exists in the present model. 
An affirmative answer can be given to this question. Two methods to 
reach this answer will be mentioned. The first consists of the use of 
a so-called fixed-point-theorem. In this way it can be shown that the 
system (2.13) has a steady state solution under very general condi-
tions. The fixed point theorem does not teil us however what values of 
the Bn's will be associated with the stationary state. Therefore in 
this section another method will be elaborated, viz. direct computa-
tion of the stationary state. Since this method is less general than 
the one that uses a fixed-point-theorem it will still be worthwile to 
pay some attention to the latter. This is done in Appendix A. 
The stationary state of the system (2.13) will now be coraputed for 
the case in which L£S, that may be associated with excess-demand on 
the housing market. This seems to be the most realistic case also. (In 
the model this requirement will always be fullfilled if W£B since then 
LSBN+I^B^BI=»S. This condition is a sufficiënt but not a necessary 
one.) If L£S q is smaller than 1 and qirm may be written as: 
qirm - (Wm - Bm)/(B-B1) m-1,...,N (2.14) 
If this is substituted in equations (2.13) it becomes clear that this 
system is a recursive one: the values of all Bn's are determined by 
those of B-|,..., Bn one period before and there is no influence of 
these of Bn+-|,... ,BJJ+I . In a stationary state all Bn's have the 
same value in successive periods. Imposing this condition it follows 
for the first equation of (1l|) (after substitution of 1^): 
BT = (1-vJW! (2.15) 
For nè2 a more complicated equation wil l be found af ter subs t i tu t ion 
of (15): 
(B-B,)B - (1-v){[ (B-B. ) -5] (W - Bm)]B + (W - Bn)(B-"Ë1.B - Bn)} i n l m = l . m m n . n n m = l m n 
n- 2.....N (2.16) 
This equation is quadratic in Bn and may be solved for that varia-
ble. The result is (see Appendix B): 
Bn= 1/2 {c - / c* - 4cn2) n- 2 N (2.17) 
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WilSP© l 
On1'= C ^ (B - B l ) + 2 J (Wm- Bm) + (B - g ; Bffl) + Wn] 
°n2= VB "SI V 
Finally the value of B{j+i in the s ta t ionary s t a t e can be obtained as 
N 
B - £ B or, a l t e rna t ive ly from writing out the l a s t equation of 
(14), the following formula can be derived: 
N 
E (W - B ) 
BN+1= vB/{1 - (1-v) (1 - t?r 1 .B : . ; .B .m • } (2.18) 
Equations (2.15), (2.17) en (2.18) show the possibility to compute 
the stationary state assooiated with a set of exogenous variables 
Wi,...,Wf|, B and v as long as LS»S, which is guaranteed if VféB.-
Since for every n Bn was shown to have a unique value the stationary. 
state will be unique. 
Once the ëxistence of a stationary state is established, the ques-
tion arises whether it • will be s_table. Since global stability of 
dynamioal systems is usually difficult to prove, attention is often 
concentrated on local stability. A system is locally stable if it 
returns to the stationary state after a small (exogenously caused) 
jump out of such a state. 
The dynamical system given by equation (2.13) is locally stable if 
!the eigenvalues of the matrix of its first-order partial derivatives 
are in absolute value smaller than 1 (see e.g., Hirsch and Smale, 
1974, pp. 280-1). Since that system was shown to be a recursive one, 
this matrix is triangular, and the eigenvalues are equal to its 
diagonal elements 9B /BB : 
n n 
3B^/3BJ _ 1= (1-V) (1 - q^) 
3BJV3B£"1- (1-V) [(1-q J|] irm) - .qirj n = 2 N \ (2.19) 
9BN+1/3BNrr (1"v)(1-q) 
From equations (2.19) it will be clear that |3Bt/3Bt~1| < 1 for all 
n=1,...,N+1. So it may be concluded that the stationary states asso-
ciated with the present model will always be locally stable. 
An argument for global stability in the case where LSS is provided 
by the following reasoning. Start by observing that the value of B-| 
will after one period always be equal to its stationary state value. 
If B2 is not equal to its stationary state value it can be higher or 
lower. In the former case it can be observed from (2.11) that the 
stream of removers from type 2 to type 1 dweiling will be greater than 
in the stationary state (since B2 is greater than in the stationary 
state while W-j-Bi and B-Bi have their stationary state values), 
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while the total stream of removers into type 2 dwellings will be 
N+1 
smaller than in the stationary state (sinoe both W - B and E B 
will be .smaller than in the stationary state). 
In the latter case the stream from 2 'to 1 will be smaller than in the 
stationary state, while the total stream into type 2 dwellings will be 
\ greater. It may be concluded that B2 moves in the direction of its 
stationary state value. As B2 approaehes that value more and more 
closely the same reasoning leads to the conclusion that B3 moves in 
the direction of its steady state value. The same will be true for 
other Bn's. Although this reasoning gives no formal proof of the 
global stability of the present system (when L^S) it strongly suggests 
this property. 
An example of the computation of the stationary state values of Bn 
and of the movement towards equilibrium is cont%ined in Appendix C. 
2.5 . Features of the stationary state 
Wi W2 Wc; % 
Table 1. Signs of partial derivatives 3B IL 
3Wm 
In Table 1 it is shown how the distribution of households among 
dweiling types is influenced by the size of the dweiling stock for 
each type. The table presents the signs of the partial derivatives of 
the number of households living in dweiling type n with respect to the 
dweiling stock of type m for all m,n. It nas been assumed here and in 
the rest of this section that L£S. The results indicate that an exten-
sion of the housing stock of type m only influences the number of 
households living in type m or in a lower quality dweiling. Not sur-
SB prisingly, ..JV. is positive for all n, and all remaining partial de-
aw n 
rivatives are negative. Note that since Bi+B2+...+BN+I=B (which 
is constant in the model), the vertical sum of the partial derivatives 
in Table 1 is zero for all columns. The general conclusion which may 
be drawn from Table 1, is that the most far reaching effects on the 
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population distribution are generated by the construction of dwellings 
of the highest quality. 
A similar result is obtained when vacancy chains are studied. A 
vacancy generated in the lowest quality of housing type (N) generates 
only one moving household (i.e. from position N+1). Similarly, a 
vacant dweiling of type N-1 may give rise to one moving household if 
this one comes from position N+1, or a chain consisting of a household 
moving from N to N-1 leaving a vacant dweiling which is occupied by a 
household coming- from position N-1. The probability of the first 
possibility is BN/(BN+BN+-|)» the probability of the second 
possibility being BN + 1/(BN+BN+I). Note that the latter statement 
depends on the assumption made about the acceptance behaviour of 
searching behaviour of searching households, i.e., all households 
accept an offered dweil ing, irrespective of the present type of dweil-* 
ing occupied, if the offered dweiling is in a higher quality class 
than the present dweiling. The statement also depends on the way the 
distribution mechanism is modelled. As indicated in section 2.2 the 
distribution takes place in a random way, which implies the absence of 
discriminative policies for starting households, both in a positive or 
negative way. These two assumptions are reflected by (2.13) where one 
finds that the transition probabilities of households from all types 
m>n to a dwelling of type n are equal. 
Given the above discussion it can easily be seen that the average 
number of moves Mn caused by a vacancy of type n is equal to: 
^ - 1 
MN-1 " t ( 1 ) BN+1 + ( 1 + V BJ / (BN+1 + V ( 2 - 2 0 ) 
Mn = [ 0 ) B H + 1 + ( 1 + M N ) B N + + < 1 + M „ + l ) B n + l ] / 
( BN+1 + BN + + ^V (n=1 N"1) 
These formulas can easily be rewritten as: 
M N * 1 
Mn = Mn+1 + Bn +1 / ( Bn +1 + +BN + BN +1 ) (n=1 N_1 ) ( 2 - 2 ° T ) 
so that it is immediately clear that vacancy chains are longer the 
higher the quality class in which the first vacancy is generated. 
We now turn to a discussion of the duration of vacancy and of resi-
dence in various dwelling types. The average duration of vacancy for 
dwelling type n (an) is in the stationary situation equal to the 
ratio of the stock of vacant dwellings in n and the number of dwell-
ings which become occupied per period (In): 
<*n = (Wn-Bn)/In (2.21) 
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Frora (2.13) we know that 
I
n= (1-v) qirn(B-B1-...-Bn) (2.22) 
Since qirn=(Wn-Bn)/(B-Bi) as already shown in (2.11), 
one obtains for an: 
N 
an=(B-B1)/{(B-B1-...-Bn).(1-v)} (2.23) 
so that the oonclusion reads that the duration of vacancy is shortest 
for n=1 and longest for n=N. 
For the average duration of residence a sirailar result can be 
obtained. In the stationary state, the duration of residence in n 
(gn) is equal to the ratio of the total nurnber of households in n 
and the number of households leaving n (En): 
Bn= Bn/En (2.24) 
From (2.13), it follows that: 
En= {v+(1-v)q(iri + ...+irn-i )}Bn (2.25) 
Note that in the stationary state En*In, In (2.24) we= use En 
rather than In since it is easier to reach conclusions on the depen-
dence of gn on n. After substituting (2.25) into (2.24) one can 
derive that the duration of residence is longest for n=1 and shortest 
for n=N. Thus, duration of residence and duration of vacancy are 
inversely related in this model. 
In the context of this model, generally speaking duration of resi-
dence is equal to duration of search before a certain move is made. 
The only exceptibns occur for n=1, where households live without 
searching and for n=N+1 where households search without having a 
dweiling. 
These outcomes on the duration of vacancy and residence can also be 
used to derive results on the vacancy rate, which is defined as: 
Yn=(Wn-Bn)/Wn (2.26) 
Since En=In in the s ta t ionary s t a t e , i t follows from (2.21), 
(2.24) and (2.26) t ha t : 
Yn= a n / ( a n + e n ) = 1/(1+6n/an) (2.27) 
As the duration of vacancy a increases with n, and the duration of 
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residence gn decreasês with n, it may be concluded that the vacancy 
rate increases with n. It is highest in the class of low quality 
dweilings. 
The various results in this section on vacancy chains, duration of 
vacancy, etc. all point into the same direction: pressure on the 
housing market is highest for high quality dwellings. The most effec-
tlve way to reduce pressure is the construction of high quality dwell-
ings. These conclusions of course strongly depend on the rather sim-
plistic assumptions underlying the model, especially the assumed 
homogeneity of households. Therefore, an extension of the present 
model will be given in the next section to take into account the 
heterogeneity of households. 
3. Extensions of the basic model 
The model descibed in the previous section can be extended in sever-
al ways. In the present section some of these extensions will be dealt 
with. We will no longer stick to the assumption of identical house-
holds; various household types will be distinguished. Consumer beha-
viour will be discussed. Further, attention will be paid to social 
mobility and its consequences for residential mobility. Attention will 
be concentrated on the equations for the streams of removers, since it 
will in general not be easy to compute steady states in an analytical 
way. 
3.1. Different types of households 
A first extension of the model concerns the possibility that dif-
ferent households will have different tastes for the types of dwell-
ings. E.g. the number of persons in a household and its income are 
highly relevant variables of housing demand. So it will be useful to 
look at the changes that have to be made in the specification of the 
model of section 2 to allow for the possibility of different types of 
households with different tastes. 
Different types of households may be distinguished on the basis of 
their characteristics and the value of their income. It will be as-
sumed that the former can be described by means of a vector x, while 
the latter will be denoted as y. Utility depends on the characteris-
tics of the households, on the quantities of the goods consumed, 
denoted by means of a vector q, and on the characteristics of the 
dweiling that is occupied, denoted as a vector z. The vector z can 
take on only N different values, each associated with one type of 
dwelling. 
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U- U(x, q, z) (3.1) 
The prices of all goods are assumed to be given and will be denoted as 
a vector p; the price of the n-th type of dweiling is denoted as 
pn. If a household would live in a residence of type n, utility is 
maximized under the budget constraint: 
£l £ + Pn = y (3.2) 
whereas 
z = z" (3.3) 
In the last equation z_n is the vector of dweiling characteristics 
associated with the n-th type of dweiling. The maximum level of utili-
ty that a household with characteristics x at given prices £ and a 
given income y is able to realize, given that it occupies a dweiling 
of type n, can be obtained by substituting the optimal values of q 
in (3-3). This value is denoted Un: 
U"= U"(x, p, p«, y, z") (3.4) 
From (3.4) it may be concluded that when all prices are given, the 
values Un for the different types of dwellings are determined by the 
values - of x and y. It is. assumed that on the basis of these varia-
bles a finite number of I types of households can be distinguished. 
The preference-ordering of the i-th type of household (i=1 I) is 
determined by the values of Un. In order to formulate the equations 
for the streams of removers for the model extended to different kinds 
of households some further notation is introduced. Sn(i) is the set 
of dweiling types that are preferred above type n by households of 
type i. Furthermore, use will be made of a variable 5: 
<5nra(i)= 1 if m e Sn(i) 
<5nm(i)= 0 if m e Sn(i) 
(3.5) 
With the aid of this variable the number of households of type i 
moving from a dweiling of type n into one of type m can be described 
as: 
snm(i) = (1~v) qirm'önmti) Bn(i) (3-6) 
n*m; n, m=1,...,N+1 
The total stream of households moving from type n dwellings into type 
1-"- e t CO L O -i e t CL s e t e t * l>0 3r 3 3" 3 Oq * M co Cfl CU O 3" O e t 3 O 
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the saaie income may nevertheless have different tastes, although this 
variability becomes smaller as more and more characteristics will be 
taken in consideration. For practical purposes it will not be possible 
to increase the number of relevant characteristics to infinity and for 
this reason some variability in tastes may have to be taken into 
account. 
This may be done by assuming that the utility that a househjlds of 
type i experiences when it occupies a dweiling of type n is the sum of 
a determinate and a stochastic part: 
vn(i) = un(i) +
 en(i) (3.7) 
In this equation Vn(i) denotes total utility experienced, Un(i) 
denotes the determinate part and e the stochastic part. The stochastic 
term en(i) is assumed to have expectation zero. 
The probability that a household of type i will be willing to move 
from a dweiling of type n to one of type m is equal to: 
Pnm(i) - Prob[Vm(i) > Vn(i)] (3.8) 
'= Prob[Um(i) - Un(i) > cn(i) - em(i)3 
If stochastic preferences are introduced in the model the equations 
for the streams of of removers become: 
snm(i) - O-v) qirmPnm(i) Bn(i) (3.9) 
Comparison with (3.6) shows that in (3.9) Pnm^) is used instead of 
önm^i)- Clearly, stochastic preferences lead to two-way traffic even 
for households of the same type, so that one may expect higher degrees 
of total residential mobility corapared with the case of deterministic 
preferences. 
The introduction of stochastic preferences removes the discontinui-
ties that are associated with the use of önm(i),s. Small changes in 
a parameter (e.g. the price of the n-th type of dwelling) may cause a 
jump from 5nm from zero to one or in the reverse direction. In the 
situation with stochastic preferences, however, small changes in 
prices may be expected to cause only small changes in the probabili-
ties pnm(i). 
Another advantage of the use of a stochastic formulation of prefer-
ences is that it relates the present model to discrete-choice-models 
(e.g. the logit model) that are widely used nowadays to analyse behav-
iour on the housing market (cf. Clark and Van Lierop, 1986). Note that 
when stochastic preferences are used in a dynamic context (e.g. by 
means of simulation models), it is usually assumed that the stochastic 
part of the utility function is independent between time periods. In 
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that case, the stochastic part can only be thought to represent fac-
tors of temporary nature such as incidental changes of income or 
preferences. 
3.3. Social mobility 
The introduction of different types of households into the model may 
be viewed as a major step towards reality. Changes in household charsa 
acteristics and incomes, together with the existence of different 
types of households with different preferences are a major determinant 
of mobility on the housing market. It will therefore be useful to 
introducé changes in household characteristics and incomes (i.e. tran-
sitions of households from one type to another) in the present model. 
In order to do this we introducé age-specific transition matrices 
T(l) the elements of which t^jd) are the probabil.ities that a 
household presently in class i and of age 1 will in the next period 
will be of class j (it will then of course also be of age 1+1). The 
age speficity is introduced here explicitly in order to facilitate the 
modelling of the demographic process that takes place jointly with the 
social mobiliy. (Note that the interpretation of the index i in sec-
tion 3.2 differs somewhat from the one presently adopted: in section 
3.2 it was wider and could also contain age as a determinant). The 
following equations may now be formulated (see also Rogers, 1975). 
t * t-1 
Bl(i,l) = (1-v^) ^ tJ:L(l-1 ) Bl '(j.l-D (3.10) 
The transition probability t.. is defined as 1-.E .t. .(1-1), the pro-
11 i*j ij 
bability of remaining in the same class. 
When social mobility and ageing are taken into account in this way, 
the equations for the streams of households becorae: 
s* (i,l) = qfcir pfc (i.D.L, (1-v, , ) t.. (1-1) Bt_1.(j,l-1) (3.11) 
nm ' M m Knm ' j=1 1-1 ji n 
n*m; n=1,...,N+1; m»1,...,N; 
New cohorts have age zero and are assumed to occur in fixed amounts: 
the values B„+.(j,0) are assumed to be exogenously given in such a way 
that population remains constant. 
Equation (3.10) introduces the possibility to take life-cycle pheno-
mena into account in the model: starting households will usually con-
sist of one or two persons with a relatively small income and will 
gradually change both in size and income and.therefore in preferences 
over types of dweilings. 
• In principle the transition probabilities may be related to explana-
tory variables, but a discussion of this topic would take us too far 
away from the subject of this paper. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
The stock-flow model implied by (3.11) is a fully interdependent 
non-linear model. Ultimately, the probabilities q, p and ir depend on 
the distribution of households over the stock of dwellings. The proba-
bility of receiving an offer depends on the vacancies of each type and 
the number of searchers, but these will in turn be determined by the 
distribution of households over the different types of dwellings. 
The stocks resulting from the flows s (i,l) can be formulated as 
* -n ran 
fo l lows : 
Bn ( i ' 1 } - m smn ( i » X ) " m Snm ( i ' X ) + J l ( 1 " V l > fcji ( 1 " 1 > 
B^"1 ( j . 1 -1 ) (3.12) 
for all relevant values of n,t,i and 1. 
One may wonder whether anything can be said about the existence and 
stability of stationary states of the present model. In the case in 
t-1 
which ir, q and p are continuous functions of the B (i.1), the exis-
tence of a stationary state is guaranteed by the Brouwer fixed-point 
theorem (see Appendix A). It is however not easy to say something on 
(local) stability, since this depends on the values of the character-
istic roots of the system (3.12) and these are hard to obtain in an 
analytical way. Therefore, the proporties of the extended housing 
market model will be investigated by means of some stimulatlons in the 
next section. 
4. Simulation experiments 
The purpose of the present section is to illustrate the working of 
the extended model described in section 3 by means of some simulation 
experiments. These experiments serve two purposes. First, they enable 
one to investigate whether the system converges towards a stationary 
state, although of course this does not really prove stationarity in 
all possible situations. For the experiments described below, in all 
cases a stationary solution was found. Second, they allow one to study 
the effects of changes in exogenous variables (and parameters) on the 
stationary state. Thus, one would be able to predict the effects of 
changes in policy (or autonomous variables) on the housing market. 
4.1. Description of the basie situation 
In order to provide meaningfull results we looked for an initial 
situation that would give a good impression of the potential of . the 
model but that would at the same time be simple enough to allow a 
clear interpretation of the results. 
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The total amount of households, as well as its coraposition over the 
different age groups and social classes is constant, i.e. a stationary 
population is used as a starting point. 
A siraple way of taking account of the life cycle is to introducé 
small and large households. All starting households are small. As time 
passes they grow in size and finally they shrink again to small house-
holds. The creation of new households is related to the shrinking of 
the older ones. 
It is assumed that households exist for a period of at most 40 years 
although most of them will disappear befort that high age is reached. 
During the first 10 years households grow in size from small to large. 
In the second period of 10 years they remain large and in the third 
decade of their existence they shrink to small size again. At the same 
time new households are created, i.e. children become adults and 
create households themselves. During the last 10 years of their possi-
ble existence the old households gradually disappear. 
Small households prefer small dwellings and large households large 
ones. In order to complicate the situation a little bit more two 
social groups are distinguished although for the time being we assume 
that no social mobility takes place between them. Thus, there are 
small and large households of two social groups. Dwellings are distin-
guished by the preferences that the different kinds of households have 
for them. There is one type of dwelling especially preferred by house-
holds of small size of the first social group, one especially pre-
ferred by those of big size of the second social group etc. All 
households are indifferent to the type of dweiling they rent when it 
is not their most preferred type. However, a dweiling of whatever kind 
is preferred to none. Preferences are, for the time being, assumed to 
be deterministic (see section 3.1.). 
In fact the assumptions mentioned above introducé a dichotomy into 
the housing markets. There are two submarkets, one for each of the 
groups. The dichotomy is not complete, however, since starting house-
holds will accept any offer and thus may rent a type of dweiling that 
will be higher preferred by households of the other social group. 
Later on we will introducé social mobility between both groups. 
Allocation is assumed to take place four times a year. This implies 
that we had to work with 160, rather than 40, periods. Searching 
households will get an offer of a vacant dweiling at most four times a 
year. The offer, the decision to move and the actual move are assumed 
to take place within a period of 3 months. 
Two types of searching households can be distinguished: the starting 
ones, who will accept any ofer they get, and those not in a type of 
dwelling they prefer most, who will accept only a dweiling of their 
most preferred type. 
In every quarter 50 new households are created, while in the same 
18 
period 50 old ones disappear, so that the total number of households 
is constant. The polulation structure is summarized in Table 2. 
Age groups of households (years)  
0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 tofc<J 
social group 1 
small 352 0 434 194 980 
large 648 959 289 0 1896 
social group 2 
small 352 0 434 194 980 
large 648 959. 289 0 1896 
itotewi 2000 1918 1446 388 5752 
Table 2. Summary of the stationary population. 
As a starting situation we use as values for the total amount of 
dwellings 900 for both types of small households. Since there are 980 
small households and 1896 large ones in each social group there exists 
a moderate overall excess demand on the housing market. In the sta-
tionary state this configuration gives rise to occupancy of 94 % of 
the small dwellings and 97 % of the big ones. The average duration of 
residence, measured as the ratio of the total number of households 
occupying a certain type of dwelling and the total outflow from that 
type of dweiling (i.e. the total number of removing and disappearing 
households), is approx. 8.7 years for the small dwellings and almost 
16 years for the large ones. This measure provides an overall picture 
of the duration of stay. Expected durations of stay for the different 
age groups, household sizes and social classes may differ widely, from 
the average figure. 
The average duration of vacancy is measured as the ratio of the 
total number of vacant dwellings and the total inflow of households 
and amounts to approx. 0.6 years for small dwellings and 0.5 years for 
large ones. 
Vacancy chains, measured analogously to the way described is section 
2, are equal to 2.05 for small dwellings and 2.16 for large ones. 
Starting households do on average have to wait almost 2.4 years 
before they get an offer. The probability of getting an offer is equal 
to some 10 % per quarter, which amounts to approx. 1/3 per year. This 
seems to be fairly low, and justifies policy measures for this group. 
Most of the households will in the start of their life cycle not 
obtain a small dweiling of their most preferred type, but after 10 
years 50 % of the households, that have all become large ones by then, 
has a dweiling especially preferred by large households of their 
social group. This percentage increases to 82 % after 20 years. In the 
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next ten years all large households beoome small again. In their 30th 
year 47 % of the households live in a small dweiling. During the last 
10 years of their existence this percentage increases to 80 % but 
only a small fraction (1 %) of the households reaoh their 40th year. 
Thus it may be ooncluded that in the market described by the model 
there exist a lot of unfulfilled wishes as is clear from the total 
number of searchers, viz. almost 2850 on a total population of 5752. 
When as much households as possible were allocated in a dwelling of 
their most preferred type the total number of searchers would have 
been 252, none of-these searchers renting a dwelling. This is less 
than 10 % of the actual number. Optimal and actual allocation are thus 
very different from each other, due to market frictions, a situation 
not unlike those regularly observed in real world housing markets. 
4.2. Changes in the dwelling stock 
As one would expect the functioning of the market becomes much more 
smooth as the stock of dwellings is increased. In our second variant 
(see Table 3) the number of both types of small dwellings is increased 
to 1000, that of big dwellings to 2000. From Table 3 it can be in-
ferred that in this case there are more vacancies due to the overall 
excess supply of 250. The duration of residence is smaller, because of 
the greater ability of people to change to a more preferred dwelling 
(the probability of obtaining an offer during one quarter is now 
0.28). The duration of vacancy has not increased much. Vacancy chains 
however have increased significantly in length. The total number of 
searchers and the number of households without a dwelling has decrea-
sed considerably. 
In the present situation of overall excess supply (i.e. the number 
of dwellings is greater than that of households), an allocation of all 
households in a dwelling of their most preferred type is perfectly 
possible, but it is not obtained due to market frictions. A relatively 
high number of households keeps searching, indicating a poor perfor-
mance of the allocation machanism. 
In a third variant of our simulation exercise a different situation 
for the segments for small and large dwellings is introduced by set-
ting the stock of dwellings for each type equal to 1375 so that the 
same total stock of dwellings was obtained as in the first variant. 
Thus in the submarkets for small dwellings there exists excess supply 
while in those for large dwellings there is excess demand. As one 
would expect the functioning of the market becomes more difficult in 
these circumstances, but no large differences with the situation in 
variant 1 appear. The duration of residence in small dwellings in-
creases, while that in large dwellings decreases. The total numbers of 
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Table 3. Summary of simulation resultsl) 
variant 1 variant 2 variant 3 variant 4 
group 1 group 1 group 1 group 1 | group 2 
small large small large small large small large|small large 
total no. of 
dweilings 900 1850 1000 2000 1375 1375 700 1650| 1100 2050 
number of 
occupied 
dweilings 844 1795 904 1908 1290 1337 660 16081 1028 1981 
vacancy rate 
(%) 6.22 2.97 9.58 4.56 6.20 2.77 5.77 2.56J 6.56 3.37 
mobility rate 
{% per year) 6.04 3.36 9.72 5.20 4.44 3.64 5.60 2.92] 6.12 3-60 
duration of 
residence 
(years) 8.73 15.84 5.91 14.34 11 .00 15.25 8.83 15.89j 8.85 15.98 
duration of 
vacancy 
(years) 0.58 0.48 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.43 0.54 0.42 j 0.62 0.55 
searching 
households 
(ï) 62.27 34.97 34.13 16.86 68.22 34.96 60.67 35.06|64.44 36.09 
length of 
vacancy 
chains 2.05 2.16 2.88 2.86 1.93 2.26 2.11 2.22| 1.96 2.06 
total no. of 
searchers 2849 1494 3260 2884 
total no. of 
vacancies 222 374 247 224 
number of 
households 
without 
dweiling 474 126 499 476 
probability of 
of receiving 
an offer 
(per quarter) 0.095 0.214 0.091 0.095 
1' Dwelling types are indicated by the household groups giving them 
highest preference. In variants 1f 2 and 3 the figures for both social 
groups are equal. Therefore only those of the first social group are 
given. 
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Table 4 Distribution of households according to age and social group 
age group (years) 
1-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 t o t a l 
group 1 
small 450 0 427 207 1084 
large 709 917 282 0 1907 
group 2 
small 254 0 442 180 876 
large 587 1002 295 0 1885 
total 2000 1918 1446 388 5752 
Table 5 presents some figures of variants 5 and 6 corresponding to 1 
and 2 resp. in the numbers of dwellings of each type. Since the num-
bers of • small and large households are not equal for both social 
groups, in the case of social mobility, figures for all four types of 
dwellings are presented. 
The introduction of social mobility between both social groups gives 
rise to a more dynamic picture of the housing market as is clear from 
a significant drop in the average duration of residence. Somewhat 
surprisingly some other variables (e.g. duration of vacancy, number of 
vacancies) do not change very much. The total number of searchers in 
the case of a moderate access supply (variant 6 as compared to variant 
2) increased significantly. Mobility rates are higher, the length of 
vacancy chains has increased as has the share of searching households. 
Summarizing, it may be said that the frietion in the market has grown 
considerably as a result of the introduction of mobility between 
social groups. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In section 2, it has been shown how the introduction of search 
elements in a regulated housing market model with various dweiling 
types leads to a non-linear dynamic system, the non-linearity being 
related to limitations in housing supply. This system has a unique and 
stable stationary state, each dweiling type being characterized by a 
different value of duration of vacancy, duration of residence and 
vacancy rate. This model differs from most usual residential search 
and mobility studies in that it takes into account that households 
moving from one dweiling to another leave a vacant dweiling, thus 
influencing the prospects of future searchers (see e.g. Rietveld, 
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Table 5. Results of the introduction of social mobility 
total no. of 
dwellings 
vacancy rate 
mobility rate 
(% per year) 
duration of 
residence 
(years) 
duration of 
vacancy 
(years) 
length of 
vacancy 
chains 
share of 
searching 
househ. {%) 
total no. of 
searchers 
total no. of 
vacancies 
total no. of 
households 
without 
dweiling 
probability of 
of receiving 
an offer 
(per quar.) 
variant 5 
group 1 group 2 
small large 
900 1850 
6.46 3-27 
6.08 3-92 
8.76 14.52 
.60 .49 
2.15 2.30 
small large 
900 1850 
7.08 3.29 
6.20 3.92 
8.61 14.33 
.65 .48 
2.08 2.30 
64.81 42.74167.14 42.35 
3198 
243 
495 
0.092 
variant 6 
group 1 group 2 
small large 
1000 2000 
9.82 4.98 
9.68 6.36 
6.10 12.00 
.66 .62 
3.12 3.20 
small large 
1000 200 
12.02 5.22 
9.84 6.44 
5.95 11.87 
.81 .65 
2.93 3.15 
43.14 27.91|44.99 27.09 
2120 
422 
174 
0.223 
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1984). 
In section 3, several extensions of the model have been discussed, 
especially the introduction of various household types, giving rise to 
the possibility to study the role of household life cycle effeets in 
the housing market. 
Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of several simulation experi-
ments with the extended household model. It appears athat in a situa-
tion of overall excess demand - with the given household preferences -
the total number of vacancies is rather insensitive to the distribu-
tion of supply over the various market segments. Failure to obtain a 
good match between supply and demand at the various sub-markets will 
only manifest itself clearly in the form of vacant dweilings when the 
situation of overall excess demand is replaced by overall excess 
supply. Even with a very low rate of excess demand on the housing 
market, the number of households searching for a better dweiling and 
the number of househods not occupying a dweiling is relat'ively large 
- given the stochastic matching mechanism of demand and supply. Thus, 
friction is an important phenomenon for the type of housing market 
considered. 
Future work with the model will be addressed to calibrating the 
model for a real world housing market. In addition, the model structu-
re can be extended or refined in various directions, for example by an 
endogenization of construction activities as well as of the number of 
households (see Snickars, 1978). Also, more refined ways of modeling 
household formation and termination have to be considered (see Rima et 
al., 1985). Further, a more refined formulation of search behaviour is 
in order (Clark, 1982). In addition, an investigation of alternative 
matching mechanisms between supply and demand would be interesting. 
Finally, an effort can be made to develop a model for an unregulated 
housing market along the lines of the present model. This would entail 
the introduction of endogenous prices into the model. 
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Appendix A* Existence of Stationary States 
We will make use of Brouwer's fixed-point-theorem (see e.g. Debreu, 
1959): 
If S is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of Rm and if f is a 
contlnuous function from S to S, then f has a fixed point. 
N+1 
In this paper S={B: 0SBSW..E B.= B}, where B is a (N+1 )-
dimensional vector with elements B'i ,... ,B.JJ+I and' W an (N+1)-
dimensional vector with elements W-| ,W2,... ,WJJ, B. Clearly S is a 
non-empty, compact and convex vector of R N +V The mapping f is given 
by equation (2.12), after substitution of (2.11). It is continuous as 
long as B-|<B, a condition that is satisfied if W-|<B, which will be 
assumed. 
A fixed-point is a vector of B that is mapped into itself, and 
therefore a distrlbution of B over the different types of dwellings 
that does not change from one period to another. This is what is 
called a stationary state in the paper and the existence of such a 
state in the model of section 2 may thus be taken for granted as long 
as W-|<Bi . 
The above theorem guarantees the existence of a stationary state 
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also in the extended version of the model given in (3.13), as long as 
q and p are continuous functions of the B (i.l)'s. 
nm nm n 
It is easy to generalize this argument to the extended models of sect-
ions 3 and 4. 
Appendix B Analytical Solution of Stationary State in the 
Basic Model 
Equation (17) can be rewritten as: 
Bn " [ TÏ7 <B'V + 5!<V V * (B "SI V + V Bn + 
+
 VB-mI11 V = ° (B1) 
This may be solved for Bn in the usual way: 
B = 1/2 {c ,± / c2 - 4c \ (B2) " 
n n1 n1 n2 
where c is the expression in square brackets in (B1) 
and c = W (B - E, B ). c , is positive and greater than W . 
n2 . n m=1 m n1 ^ ° n 
The expression c2• - 4 c is positive since c2 contains only positive 
terms, among which 2Wn (B-nË, B ) + W2 + (B~nË, B ) z and the sum-of 
m=l m n m=1 m 
the latter two is at least as great as 2W (B- E.B ) since 
n m=1 m 
[W - (B- E„ B )]2 is positive. So it may be concluded that there will 
n m=l m 
be two real roots for Bn. Only the root associated with the rainus-
sign in (B2) is of relevance however since Bn has to be smaller than 
Wn, so that c-| + /c2i - 4c2 has to be smaller than 2Wn: 
o + /c2 - 4c0 < 2W M 1 1 2 n 
T/CZ - 4c„ S 2W - e., 1 2 n 1 
'1 2 n n 1 1 
C0 = W n ( B • m ^ 1 B m ) = W n < ° 1 ~ W n ) 
2 n m=l m n 1 n 
The last inequality is however contradicted by the.fact that c con-
tains only positive terms among which W and (B- E B ). It may be Con-
cluded therefore that the positive sign in (B2) is never relevant. 
